The structure of belief systems in the Dutch general public by KRIESI, HANSPETER
European Sociological Review, Vol. 6 No. 2, September 1990
© Oxford University Press 1990
165
The structure of belief systems in the Dutch
general public
HANSPETER KRIESI
ABSTRACT Several new concepts and measures for the analysis of political belief systems of citizens in liberal
democracies are proposed. These concepts make a systematic distinction between values and beliefs about the
status quo, and between the differentiation and integration of political belief systems. Applying the proposed
instruments to the Dutch general public, the political beliefs of the average Dutch turn out to be fragmented,
but not inconsistent. Traces of the two classic dimensions of ideological space could still be identified, as could
indications of the existence of a third, 'new' dimension concerning political conflicts in 'new' issue areas.
Moreover, even if the belief structures to be found are predominantly fragmented ones, taking them into
account allows for more parsimonious explanations of important aspects of political attitudes and political
behavior. The results are consistent with the present state of ideological flux in the Netherlands.
INTRODUCTION
At the end of the eighties, the end of ideology
seems to have become reality after all. Thus, the
Netherlands of the late eighties have been said
to constitute an 'ideological vacuum' (Kalma,
1988: 19). Traditional ideological packages are
disintegrating, and the three dominant political
camps of the socialists, christian-democrats and
liberals are all trying to reorient themselves. The
declining saliency of traditional social cleavages,
the challenge of the so-called new social move-
ments in the cultural and ecological sphere, the
growing unease with an ever-increasing welfare
state, and the failure of classic macro-economic
recipes have left all the traditional -isms in
disarray. The end of the established ideologies
does not, however, imply that general political
ideas have become irrelevant for the political
debate of the day (Stuurman, 1986). More
accurately, the demise of the old ideologies
seems to result in a state of ideological flux
giving rise to a multiplication of partial world
views falling short of the classic encompassing
visions. As Dalton (1988) has shown in his
analysis of the public opinion in the four major
Western countries, political interests among the
citizenry of Western democracies have in fact
proliferated and diversified in the more recent
past. In a similar vein, a number of researchers
of Western European mass publics—Barnes and
Kaase et al., (1979), Burklin (1981), Dalton
(1988) or Inglehart (1983) among others—have
pointed to the emergence of a 'new politics'
dimension involving conflicts over a new set of
issues—environmental quality, alternative life
styles, minority rights, participation, and social
equality.
In this paper, I would like to study the extent
to which the general political beliefs of the
Dutch general public can be said to be struc-
tured at all under the present conditions of
ideological flux. For this purpose I first intro-
duce some conceptual distinctions with regard to
the building blocks of belief systems. These
distinctions build on an important tradition in
American political science for which values are
at the center of one's political beliefs. Following
this tradition, I shall also assume that there are a
limited number of basic dimensions structuring
the ideological space, which are ultimately
rooted in the societal cleavage structure. Under
conditions of ideological flux, the number of
these basic dimensions may increase, or they
may lose their guiding capacity to a considerable
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extent. Nevertheless, according to the position
taken here, the ideological space can still
be expected to bear the mark of basic political
conflicts of the past and the present.
CONCEPTUALIZATION
The building blocks of belief systems
Following the conception of values of Rokeach
(1968: 124), an important tradition in American
political science considers values to be a type of
belief, centrally located within one's total belief
system, about how one ought or ought not to
behave, or about some end-state of existence
worth or not worth attaining. Some of the major
work on political belief systems, such as the one
of Inglehart, essentially deals with values only.
Although it contrasts with other classical con-
ceptualizations in the social sciences (see
Kluckhohn et al., 1951), I do not want to take
issue with the inclusion of values in the general
category of beliefs. I would like to suggest,
however, that the nature of general belief
systems could be clarified by a systematic
distinction between values as 'conceptions of the
desirable' and corresponding beliefs as 'concep-
tions of the real or possible'. According to the
classical definition of Kluckhohn et al. (1951:
395), values are 'conceptions of the desirable'
which provide general criteria for the selection
among available means and ends in various
specific situations. The cue words are 'right' or
'wrong', 'good' or 'bad'. Kluckhohn et al.
deliberately included the word 'conception' in
their definition. As they put it (p. 400), 'the
combination of conception with desirable estab-
lishes the union of reason and feeling inherent in
the word value'.1 Political values in particular
refer to general conceptions of the desirable
type of society (van Deth, 1984: 65). For every
political value, there is also a corresponding
political belief about the existing state of society,
and about the possibilities inherent in this
society. This type of belief refers to the
categories 'true' or 'false', 'correct' or
'incorrect'.
A given political value and the corresponding
general political belief about the status quo may,
but need not coincide. The conception of a given
aspect of the desirable society may be in accord-
ance with what one perceives as the reality of
one's own society, or it may differ from one's
conception of reality. If a given political value
and the corresponding general political belief
about the status quo are in agreement, the value
serves to justify the existing reality. For
example, someone who puts a high value on
'equality' and perceives the existing distribution
of goods and privileges as equal, considers the
status quo as just or good in this respect. The
same applies to someone who values 'inequality'
highly, and who perceives the real distribution
of goods and privileges as unequal. For someone
whose value does not agree with his or her
perception of reality, the value is a justification
for change, or, in Mannheim's terms, the value
defines a Utopia.2 There are conservative and
progressive Utopias. In the case of equality, a
desired change in the direction of more equality
would constitute a 'progressive Utopia', while a
desired change in the direction of less equality
would constitute a 'conservative Utopia'.
As Kluckhohn et al. (1951: 396) have put it,
'values are ideas formulating action commit-
ments'. The direction and intensity of action
commitments, however, can only be specified if
the values are related to the corresponding
beliefs about the status quo. We may assume
that an individual actor who perceives a discrep-
ancy between a given value and the corre-
sponding general belief has a certain potential
to take part in political action to change the
existing situation, while an actor who does not
perceive any discrepancy between the two is
most likely not to have any potential for political
action at all. In general, we can assume that the
larger the discrepancy between a given political
value and the corresponding belief, the greater
will be the commitment to change in the desired
direction.
Discrepancies between values and beliefs may
develop as a result of a change of values and/or
as a result of a change of corresponding beliefs
about the real or possible. Studies of value
change have tended to overlook this point, as is
implicitly argued by Lowe and Riidig (1986:
517f) in their critique of the research that
attributes the rise of 'environmentalism' to a
value change.3 Not only a change in the concep-
tion of the desirable, but also a change in the
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conception of the real, which is the result of real
changes in the world we live in, may contribute
to action commitments. Thus, the rise in
'environmentalism' may not necessarily result
from a fundamental change of values, but from a
changed perception of the real threat associated
with the deterioration of environmental con-
ditions. Instead of being a 'luxury' of those who
have satisfied their basic needs and are, there-
fore, able to develop 'postmaterialist' values,
'environmentalism' may be a reaction to a
change in basic beliefs, the result of an insight
into the risks and limits involved in the evolution
of modern societies (Kriesi, 1987).
If a perceived discrepancy between the
desired state of society and the existing one may
be assumed to be a necessary condition for
commitment to political action, it is not a suf-
ficient one. An actor may recognize a discrep-
ancy between the desired and the real, but
attach no great emotion to it. The value in
question may have a relatively low priority
within the actor's system of values. In this case,
although the actor perceives a particular dis-
crepancy between the desired social arrange-
ment and the existing situation, s/he will evalu-
ate this discrepancy as a comparatively minor
one. Consequently, the actor's commitment to
action implied by the discrepancy will turn out to
be relatively low. It is the salience, centrality or
intensity of a given discrepancy which is prob-
ably the most appropriate indicator of a commit-
ment to action with regard to a given dimension
of political values. It may be assumed that the
salience of a given discrepancy increases with its
size, i.e. the more a certain aspect of the desired
state of society deviates from the existing one in
someone's perception, the more salient it will be
for the person in question.
This conceptualization of values and beliefs
closely parallels Gurr's (1970) conceptualization
of 'relative deprivation'. According to Gurr
(1970: 23), the term 'relative deprivation' refers
to 'the tension that develops from a discrepancy
between the "ought" and the "is" of collective
value satisfaction'. He defined 'relative depriva-
tion' as the 'actors' perception of discrepancy
between their value expectations and their value
capabilities' (p. 24). An intensely felt discrep-
ancy between a political value and the corre-
sponding political belief about the existing state
can be thought of as a particular instance of
relative deprivation—a relative deprivation with
regard to a general property of the type of
society one would want to live in.
The structure of belief systems
Political values and corresponding general
beliefs about the real or possible held by an
individual citizen may form a more or less
coherent whole. The concept of 'ideology' most
closely corresponds to a coherent system of
discrepancies between political values and gen-
eral political beliefs about the status quo. Full
fledged ideologies provide explicit, systematic
maps of the existing world and of the world to be
desired, they give a description of how the two
relate to each other, and a prescription of how to
get from the one to the other.
Ideologies can be thought of as hierarchical
cognitive structures with different levels of
abstraction. The more elaborate an ideology is,
the more abstract the most abstract of its rela-
tively central elements can be expected to be
(Luskin, 1987). Moreover, elaborate ideologies
imply a high degree of coherence of someone's
political beliefs at an abstract level, and strong
implications of the positions held at an abstract
level for someone's more specific political
beliefs. Recent studies have shown the utility of
examining belief systems on at least two levels:
general political beliefs, and issue-oriented
beliefs (Sniderman et al., 1984; Peffley and
Hurwitz, 1985). Accordingly, we can make a
distinction between two types of constraints in
political belief systems: 'horizontal' constraints,
which refer to the structure of beliefs on each
one of the two levels of abstraction, and 'verti-
cal' constraints which refer to the correspon-
dence between concrete beliefs and the more
abstract or fundamental ones. In the subsequent
analysis, I shall concentrate on the general
political beliefs, and the question of 'horizontal'
constraints among them.
Ideologies are considered to be collective
cognitive maps rooted in fundamental societal
conflicts and propagated by political organiz-
ations. The major ideologies have built on a few
basic structural cleavages, which has tended to
reduce the ideological space to a few underlying
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dimensions. In the American case, the
ideological space has tended to be uni-dimen-
sional, opposing liberals and conservatives. This
simple one-dimensional model has recently been
criticized by Conover and Feldman (1981,1984),
who suggest that there are multiple distinct
schemas on different levels of abstraction in
distinct subject areas which represent different
ways of organizing political information. With
respect to Western Europe, Lipset and Rokkan
(1967) have suggested that there are two basic
societal cleavages underlying the major
ideologies: the cleavages of 'religion' and 'class'.
Following their argument, the political
ideologies that have patterned political beliefs
over the past two centuries can be interpreted as
the legacy of the political conflicts associated
with these two basic cleavages. The main '-isms'
have been shaped in the course of these two
conflicts and, although transformed and adapted
to changed circumstances, they can still be
expected to build upon this legacy. Sche-
matically speaking, the two conflicts have been
about two fundamental political values: liberty
and equality.4 On the class or social-economic
dimension, a bourgeois position is opposed
to a socialist one, on the religious or cultural
dimension a liberal position faces a traditional
one.
This two-dimensional conception has been
criticized in two ways. First, an argument has
been made that, in the course of the time, the
two-dimensional structure described by Lipset
and Rokkan has been reduced to a uni-
dimensional contrast between the left and the
right. For the Netherlands in particular, van der
Eijck and NiemOller (1983: 224) have suggested
that 'only a left-right dimension is of dominant
and universal significance in people's political
cognitions and preferences', since the economic
and religious cleavages tend to be largely paral-
lel. While accepting this type of reasoning, other
scholars have discerned the more recent
emergence of a new type of cleavage cutting
across the traditional left-right one. As indi-
cated previously, this alleged second cleavage is
said to refer to new types of political issues
which are not accommodated by the left-right
dimension5. If we do not follow the reasoning of
van der Eijck and Niemoller, and there are
indications that their arguments are premature,6
the emergence of a new type of cleavage could
even result in a three-dimensional ideological
space.
The political beliefs of the mass public can be
said to be coherently structured by collective
ideologies to the extent that they are organized
along a very limited number of underlying
dimensions. In a state of ideological flux, we
would expect this number to be increasing.
Moreover, in such a situation even a pluri-
dimensional space can be expected to fit the
increasingly numerous combinations of
individually held beliefs only to a limited extent.
Quite generally, individuals are not 'passive
bearers of ideology, but active appropriators'
who interpret and apply ideological packages in
the light of their proper experiences and
resources (Willis, 1977: 175). But in a situation
of ideological disarray, where they lack the
guidance of dominant ideologies, idiosyncratic
configurations of political beliefs can be
expected to proliferate.
From the point of view of a given full-fledged
collective ideology, idiosyncrasy may generally
take one of two forms: inconsistency or frag-
mentation. Full-fledged ideologies are charac-
terized by a high degree of differentiation and
integration. A high degree of differentiation
means that they include a large number of
beliefs that cover the whole range of the political
universe. By contrast, a high degree of inte-
gration means that the various beliefs included
are tightly interconnected, or, in Converse's
(1964) terms, constrained. Ideological incon-
sistency refers to a lack of integration. It implies
that the various beliefs of an individual are not
constrained by a given ideology, but that one
subscribes to political beliefs belonging to
different, or even conflicting ideological
systems. Ideological fragmentation refers to a
lack of differentiation. It implies that an
individual only holds a limited number of beliefs
which are restricted to a limited number of issue
areas. In other words, inconsistency is indicative
of a contradictory point of view, while fragmen-
tation is indicative of a partial point of view. For
example, people who, at one and the same time,
defend some major tenets of socialist and bour-
geois ideology are inconsistent, but those, who
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defend some major tenets of socialist ideology
without caring about others, are partial.
Finally, it is important to distinguish incon-
sistency and fragmentation from indifference.
An indifferent person does not have any
political beliefs at all. Given the conceptualiz-
ation of the building blocks of the individual
system of political beliefs introduced above, a
completely indifferent person does not perceive
any discrepancies between the desired state of
society and the existing one about which s/he
feels strongly at all.7 While a state of ideological
flux is likely to contribute to inconsistency and
fragmentation, it does not seem to increase the
amount of indifference (Dalton, 1988).
OPERATION ALIZATION
To operationalize these general conceptions,
three types of questions were developed, to be
asked for each one of 12 different political
values and corresponding general beliefs about
the real. The questions were presented—as part
of a larger study—to a representative sample of
1,683 Dutch people aged 16 or older in 1987.
The questions were asked by a computer assis-
ted procedure (De Pijper and Saris, 1986),
whereby the respondents answer the ques-
tionnaire in their own home. They are supplied
with a home computer by the research organiz-
ation. The interview is sent to the respondent by
telephone as soon as s/he switches on his or her
computer, and the answers are also sent back to
the research organization by telephone as soon
as s/he has concluded his or her interview.
The first question was concerned with a gen-
eral political belief about existing Dutch society.
The second question asked about the corre-
sponding political value.8 Both of these ques-
tions had to be answered using a six-point scale.
If the answers to the two questions did not
agree, i.e. if a respondent saw a discrepancy
between the existing situation and the desired
type of society, s/he was confronted with the
discrepancy and was asked to evaluate this dis-
crepancy. S/he could do so by using the cursor of
the computer to draw a line over a maximum of
38 columns. The longer the line the respondent
drew, the stronger his or her feelings about the
discrepancy in question. Figures A-l to A-3 in
the Appendix present the exact wording of the
questions, using the example of the value aspect
of'law and order'.
Values are often operationalized by present-
ing respondents a list of items they are asked to
rank. Such value instruments as the Allport-
Vernon-Lindzey scale, the measures of
Rokeach, or Inglehart's postmaterialism scale
all make use of ranking procedures. Theoretical
as well as methodological arguments are given
for the choice of ranking procedures (van Deth,
1983: 410). Ranking is thought to be theoreti-
cally preferable, because it confronts the
respondent with a situation of conflict where
s/he, just as in real life, has to make a choice
between a number of highly valued items. Rank-
ing reveals individual priorities among items
which are all supposed to be generally highly
valued. Ranking is, therefore, also said to have
the methodological advantage of introducing
variation into the responses. If instead of rank-
ing a separate rating of each value-item is asked
for, and all the items are highly valued by almost
everyone, analysis will be made virtually impos-
sible because of lack of variation.
But ranking procedures also have serious
shortcomings which, on balance, make me
prefer ratings of separate items over rankings
(van Deth, 1983). First of all, rankings imply
that the measures of the different values are not
independent of one another. As is well known,
the statistical analysis of such interdependent, or
'ipsative', measures, is full of pitfalls. Secondly,
rankings of items only have meaning for a given
individual, and interpersonal comparisons of
rankings should be distrusted: rankings inform
us about the relative position of a given value in
the individual value-system, but not about the
measure of endorsement of a value on a scale
common to ah1 respondents. Take a respondent
A who has to rank-order four values, all of
which he finds very significant, and compare the
ranking of this respondent to the one of a
respondent B, who finds all the four values
presented rather insignificant. The rank of a
given value in the ordering of the two res-
pondents does not tell us anything about the
commitment to action involved. Third and most
importantly from the point of view of the
present study, the ranking procedure tends to
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imply an overestimation of structure at the
individual level. It forces the respondent to
compare a list of stimuli, which s/he has never
thought about as being part of the same uni-
verse. The respondent may be induced to rank-
order the stimuli, although they are, in part at
least, incomparable to him or her.
To opt for ratings instead of rankings is not to
eliminate the element of choice in the oper-
ationalization of values. Following Cotgrove and
Duff (1980, 1981), I have presented the
respondents for each value aspect with a choice
between two types of ideal societies. They had
to make a choice between the two, whereby they
had the possibility of qualifying their preference
on a six-points scale as is indicated in Figure A-2
in the Appendix.9 If all political values are
consensual in a society, this procedure still
implies a lack of variation for the analysis. But
suppose that we find consensus with regard to a
given value. As argued above, this does not yet
imply that there are no differences in the popu-
lation in terms of commitment to action con-
cerning this value, since there may well be large
differences with regard to the corresponding
belief about the existing society in the popu-
lation in question. To check the discriminatory
capacity of different values and beliefs I have
presented a small sample of respondents with 20
items in a pretest. The 20 items included in the
pretest were selected pragmatically from among
aspects which appeared to be crucial in the
ideological packages of the major political
forces, and in the public debate in the
Netherlands at the time of the study. The choice
of these 20 items was guided by the idea that the
items should cover the whole range of beliefs
associated by various authors with the cultural,
socio-economic and the 'new' dimension of the
ideological space. From these items I have
picked the 12 that produced the largest overall
discrepancies between values and corresponding
beliefs for the study presented here.10
These 12 items cannot be unambiguously
assigned to a distinct hypothetical underlying
dimension on a priori grounds. Three of the
selected items can be assumed to have a strong
association with the cultural dimension—i.e. the
items referring to 'law and order', 'church rules',
and a 'strong army'. They all are concerned with
the conflict between traditional authority and
individual autonomy. But this is not their only
reference point. Thus, the Christian element has
been very strong in the (new) Dutch peace
movement, and a pacifist element is also to be
found in the socialist tradition. Four items refer
to the hard core of the classic social-democratic
program—'equality of opportunity', 'equality of
income', 'full employment', and 'citizens' par-
ticipation'. In other words, these items are
supposed to correspond to the social-economic
dimension. At the same time, however, 'equal
opportunity' and 'participation' also play an
important role in 'new' issue areas. The last five
items, at first sight, seem to indicate various
aspects of the 'new politics' dimension—two
items referring to specific types of equality of
opportunity (one for women, and one for
foreigners), and one item each for 'environ-
mental protection', 'new technologies', and
'meritocracy'. It is, however, possible that they
do not all indicate the same 'new' dimension, or
that they are also interrelated with more tra-
ditional aspects of the ideological space.
With regard to the wording of the items I have
tried to account for the central, pervasive, and
relatively enduring character of values while at
the same time avoiding formulations so abstract
as to be unintelligible for the general public. The
idea was to tap the general conceptions that
played a role in the issue-specific debates in the
Netherlands at the time of the study, but not to
ask about issue-specific attitudes. Figure 1 gives
the exact wording of the 12 items I have finally
chosen for the study, in the sequence as the
items were presented to the respondents.
The subsequent analysis is based on the
indicators for the intensity of a discrepancy
between a given value and the corresponding
belief about the status quo. As expected, the
size of a given discrepancy is closely related to its
salience. The correlations between discrepancies
and corresponding intensities vary between 0-86
and 0-92. These close correlations between dis-
crepancies and intensities imply that higher
intensities are attached to increasing discrep-
ancies, irrespective of the sign of the discrep-
ancy. That is, the emotions involved in
conservative Utopias are just as intensive as the
ones involved in progressive ones. Although
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FIGURE 1 Exact wording of the 12 items used to
operationalize values/beliefs
What do you find desirable? A society:/
How do you evaluate the existing Dutch situation? Is it a
society:
1. with little/great emphasis on law and order
2. where people live independently of/according to church
rules
3. with equal/unequal chances for all
4. with little/strong emphasis on equal chances for women
5. with participation/no participation of citizens in
important government decisions
6. with rewards independent/dependent on
achievements^
7. with no/strong differences in income
8. with equal chances for foreigners/better chances for
Dutch
9. with no/gTeat emphasis on full employment
10. where environment is more important than welfare/
welfare is more important than environment
11. where a very cautious use is made of new technologies/
where new technologies are strongly stimulated
12. with/without a strong army
Note: (a) this item will subsequently be called 'meritocratic
orientation'
discrepancies and intensities are highly
correlated, I prefer to rely on intensities,
because, as I have argued above, intensities
correspond more closely to the concept of 'ideas
formulating action commitments'. I will subse-
quently use the signed intensities, the sign
depending on the direction of the discrepancy.
Respondents who, for whatever reason, are
indifferent with regard to a given item are
assigned an intensity of zero. The resulting
intensity variables have a range from —38
to +38.
RESULTS
The structure of general beliefs
To discover abstract ideological patterns, one
has often looked at correlations. Table 1
presents the correlation matrix for the signed
intensities for the whole sample. In this matrix,
the 12 items are ordered into two clusters: the
three aspects thought to be most strongly associ-
ated with the cultural dimension are listed first,
followed by a cluster composed of the four items
supposed to be related to the social-economic
dimension, and of three of the five items sup-
posed to indicate aspects of the 'new' dimension.
The two items referring to meritocracy and new
technologies are placed at the end of the Table.
They hardly correlate at all with any of the other
value aspects, and not with each other either.
The two classic dimensions suggested by Lipset
and Rokkan are visible to the extent that the
intercorrelations between items belonging to the
same cluster are, on the whole, somewhat higher
than the intercorrelations between items not
assumed to belong to the same cluster. But even
the correlations within clusters are rather low.
The overall impression is one of little integration
of the ideological space, as we would have
expected given the general situation of
ideological flux.
Could we find a more coherent result, if we
TABLE 1 Correlation matrix for signed intensities (whole sample, n = 1683)
Item
1. Law and order
2. Church rules
3. Strong army
4. Equal chances
5. Equal ch women
6. Equal ch foreigners
7. Equal income
8. Participation
9. Full employment
10. Environment
11. Meritocracy
12. New technology
1
0-24
0-24
-003
010
0-12
-0-03
-001
-016
-0-02
0-18
004
2
0-24
018
0-25
017
011
0-20
010
015
009
-004
3
—
015
0-17
018
0-20
0-18
007
015
016
010
4
—
0-33
0-30
0-46
0-37
0-27
0-25
007
008
5
—
0-34
0-26
0-25
015
019
009
004
6
—
018
019
008
0-28
012
004
7
—
0-26
0-26
012
018
0-23
8
—
0-25
0-24
001
003
9
—
014
001
002
10
—
-003
001
11
—
010
12
—
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TABLE 2 Correlations among indicators of general beliefs:
averages for the 12 items, and standard deviations^*)
Type of belief
Beliefs about
status quo
Values
Discrepancies
Signed intensities
Whole
Average
0 0 8
010
0-14
015
sample
r S.D.
009
0-10
0-11
0-11
Those inost
concerned
Average r
0-12
0-15
0-20
0-20
S.D.
011
0 1 3
014
0-13
Note: (a) Respondents who don't know or do not want to
give an answer are coded in a neutral position.
were to base our analysis on a different building
block, i.e. on values, beliefs, or signed discrep-
ancies instead of on signed intensities? Table 2
presents the average correlations between
beliefs about the status quo, values, signed
discrepancies, and signed intensities for the
whole sample, and for a group of persons who
are particularly concerned with questions of
political beliefs.11 As this Table shows, we could
not have done better by choosing a different unit
of analysis. Quite to the contrary, while the
differences with the signed discrepancies are
slight, the signed intensities are more strongly
patterned than beliefs about the status quo or
values. This indicates that we gain some
information about ideological structures by
systematically relating values and beliefs about
the status quo. As expected, the average corre-
lations turn out to be somewhat higher for those
who are particularly concerned with general
beliefs. However, even for this select group the
emerging pattern is a rather loose one. This can
be taken as a strong indicator of the presumed
situation of general ideological disintegration.
Luskin (1987: 869) maintains that correlations
tell us little about political sophistication. Ac-
cording to his view, even sizeable correlations
are not necessarily good indicators of sophisti-
cation. Large correlations, he argues, only mean
that the respondents' answers are internally
consistent, but not that they have consciously
thought about the items involved. The consist-
ency may result entirely from cue taking, or
from unreflected common experiences. If any-
thing, he concludes, correlations between atti-
tudes do not tend to be 'too low', but 'too high'.
However, taken as indicators of ideological pat-
terning of individual thinking—whatever its ori-
gin—correlations are neither 'too low', nor 'too
high'.12 The low correlations we find are likely
to reflect quite accurately the fact that under
conditions of disintegration of classical
ideologies, external cue taking hardly con-
tributes to coherent views at all.
The question is whether under these con-
ditions we can find any structure in the political
beliefs of the Dutch public at all. In order to
answer this question, I have made use of latent
attitude models. Latent attitude models assume
that most respondents have real preferences that
remain stable over time. If the structure of these
preferences does not become visible in the
correlation matrix, these models assume that
this is because of measurement errors. As
Inglehart (1985) points out, measurement errors
indicate random answering which is the result of
the pervasive phenomenon of lack of time and
motivation in the survey situation.13 To test
whether there is an underlying preference struc-
ture which may be masked by measurement
errors, I have analyzed the correlations between
the signed intensities with LISREL VI. From
this analysis I have excluded the two items which
are hardly connected to the other ten items at
all. I have performed separate analyses for the
whole sample, and for the group of those most
concerned. In a stepwise fashion, I have tested
different models with varying numbers of under-
lying dimensions. Table 3 presents the CHISQ-
Goodness of fit measures for the different
models as well as their degree of freedom.
Whether we take the sample as a whole, or
only the group of those most concerned, the
Table shows that none of the models fits the data
very well. However, the general message of this
series of tests is quite clear: the fit of the model
can be significantly improved by combining the
introduction of additional underlying dimen-
sions with certain modifications of the original
specification. The baseline model is a 1-factor
model representing a hypothetical left-right
dimension. The 2-factor model A is thought to
operationalize Lipset and Rokkan's classic two-
dimensional ideological space, the two dimen-
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TABLE 3 Tests for dimensionality of ideological space: alternative factor models for whole sample and group
most concerned
Model
Whole sample
(n=1683)
CfflSQ d.f.
Those most concerned
(n=340)
CHISQ d.f.
1. 1-factor-model
2. 2-factors A, uncorr.
3. 2-factors A, corr.
4. 2-factors B, uncorr
5. 2-factors B, corr.
6. 2-factors C, uncorr.
7. 3-factors, uncorr.
8. 3-factors, + PH(3,2)
9. 3-factors, + PH(3,1), PH(3,2)
436-45 35
446-16
330-00
879-84
428-91
247-79
333-30
199-84
139-42
35
34
35
34
33
31
30
29
180-91 35
200-28
130-92
321-47
176-23
127-67
128-15
81-66
64-63
35
34
35
34
33
31
30
29
sions being assumed to be independent of each
other. In this model, the three 'cultural' items
have been assigned to the first dimension. The
remaining seven items have all been used as
indicators of the social-economic dimension,
assuming that the 'new' dimension is not to be
distinguished from the social-economic one. A
comparison of the fit of this model with the
baseline model indicates that this model repre-
sents a significant improvement, but only if we
allow the two factors to be correlated. The
correlations between the two factors turn out to
be quite substantial (r=0-51 and 0-62 for the
whole sample, and for those most concerned
respectively).
The 2-factor model B corresponds to the
combination of a left-right dimension with a
'new' one. In this case, the three 'cultural' items,
'equality of opportunity', 'equality of income',
and 'full employment' have been used as
indicators of the left-right continuum, while the
remaining four items—'participation', equality
of opportunity for 'women' and for 'foreigners',
and 'environmental protection'—have been
assigned as indicators for the 'new' dimension.
As can be seen from Table 3, such a model does
not fit the data at all, if we do not allow the two
factors to correlate. Moreover, even if we allow
for correlated factors, it does not represent any
improvement over the baseline model. This is
not surprising, because the two factors turn out
to be very strongly correlated (r=0-91 and 0-90
respectively). In other words, the idea of a
second 'new' issue-cleavage cross-cutting the
classic left-right dimension does not seem to be
very promising for the case of the Netherlands.
The 2-factor model can, however, be substan-
tially improved by allowing two of the three
indicators of the cultural dimension—the items
for 'church rules' and for 'strong army'—to be
indicators of the social-economic dimension as
well (2-factor model C). Substantively, this
implies that the two indicators do not exclusively
tap the underlying distinction between tra-
ditional authority and individual liberty, but that
they have other aspects as well. With regard to
the churches in the Netherlands, it may plausibly
be argued, as already indicated, that they have
long been concerned with issues dealing with
social justice and peace. With regard to the
army, it may also be argued quite plausibly that
it has divided socialists from partisans of a
bourgeois point of view, independently of ques-
tions relating to traditional authority and
individual liberty.
The 3-factor model drops the assumption that
the 'new' dimension has been completely assimi-
lated by the social-economic one. It posits a
third factor for the 'new' politics. The indicators
for the 'new' politics are supposed to be: all
items for equality of opportunity, environmental
protection, participation, and the item concern-
ing the churches (given the strong support the
peace movement has found in the churches).
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TABLE 4 Factor loadings and reliabilities for the best three-factor model
Item
1. Law and order
2. Church rules
3. Strong army
4. Equal opportunity
5. Equal income
6. Full employment
7. Participation
8. Equal opp. women
9. Equal opp. foreigners
10. Environment
Factor 1
(cultural)
0-593
0-322
0-461
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Factor 2
(social-
economic)
_
_
0-293
0-579
0-625
0-426
0-226
-
-
-
Factor 3
('new')
_
0-318
-
0-200
-
-
0-323
0-591
0-539
0-388
Reliability
0-351
0-261
0-288
0-520
0-391
0181
0-247
0-345
0-286
0148
The indicators for the social-economic dimen-
sion, i.e. essentially for classic social-democratic
politics, as opposed to bourgeois politics, are:
equality of opportunity for all (but not for
foreigners or women in particular), equality of
incomes, full employment, participation, and
the item concerning the army (given the division
between social democrats and bourgeois parties
with regard to the army). As is indicated by
Table 3, the introduction of a third factor only
improves the fit of the model, if we allow it to be
correlated with the first two. In that case, how-
ever, the improvement is substantial, which
suggests that the underlying ideological space
has at least three dimensions. While the first two
dimensions in this model are independent of
each other, the third dimension turns out to be
moderately correlated with the cultural one
(r=0-31), and substantially with the social-
economic one (r=0-64). This indicates that the
content of the 'new' dimension is related to the
one of the classical two, but that there is still
reason to take into account its separate exist-
ence.14
Table 4 presents the factor-loadings for the
final 3-factor model for the whole sample, as
well as the reliabilities of the different
indicators. All loadings are significant, even if
they are not all very impressive. The reliabilities
are quite low, too, as we could have expected.
For the group of those most concerned we
essentially obtain the same results, with some-
what higher reliabilities. This is to say that even
a three-dimensional solution does not represent
the ideological space very well. Although I have
excluded the two apparently unrelated 'new'
aspects from the analysis, the resulting structure
cannot be called anything but loose.
Inconsistency or Fragmentation?
Is this lack of structure an expression of incon-
sistent or of partial views on the part of the
individual citizens? To find an answer to this
question, I have first followed a suggestion of
Barton and Parsons (1977): I have calculated the
standard deviation of an individual's responses
to the different items associated with a given
factor from his or her own mean. This measure
tells us whether an individual tends to answer all
the items which are supposed to indicate the
same underlying dimension in the same sub-
stantive direction, or whether s/he is incon-
sistent across items. Applying this measure to
the Dutch data, I have found a rather unexpec-
ted result: the more a person is interested in
politics, and the more someone is concerned
about general political beliefs, the larger the size
of one's standard deviation, i.e. the more incon-
sistent the person appears to be according to the
measure of Barton and Parsons.
How is this possible? The problem of the
measure proposed by Barton and Parsons is that
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TABLE 5 Fragmentation and inconsistency of the belief systems of the Dutch general public: percentages having strongly
felt discrepancies, social-economic dimension, 2-factor model /!<•'
Number of
strongly felt discrepancy
bougeois direction
Number of strongly felt discrepancy in socialist direction
13-8
2-3
0-3
0 1
0-1
11-6
2-5
1 0
0-4
_
11-3
2-8
0-7
0-3
_
12-1
3-6
0-5
-
0 1
111
2-4
0-4
-
_
9-2
1-3
0-2
-
_
6-9
1-2
-
-
_
0-2 0 1
3-5
Note: (a) strongly felt discrepancies are being defined as discrepancies felt with an intensity of at least +20.
it is not a pure measure of inconsistency. It is
also a function of the degree of fragmentation of
an individual's belief system. Someone with a
partial view, i.e. with strong feelings about
selected items only, will also be characterized by
a high standard deviation. Moreover, according
to this measure an indifferent person turns out
to be highly consistent. Indifferent citizens do
not have any strong feelings about politics at all
and, therefore, their attitudes show no great
variation across the different aspects of the
belief system.15 This paradoxical result can be
explained by the fact that people who are
interested in politics and who are concerned
about general political beliefs are more likely to
hold some strong views about basic political
beliefs than the average citizen, but that their
views, too, tend to be partial ones.
The views of the Dutch general public are not
so much inconsistent but partial: only 10 per
cent of the sample have discrepancies on all
dimensions, and only very few people (0-4 per
cent) have strongly felt discrepancies (intensities
of +20) on all dimensions. The relative import-
ance of fragmentation and inconsistency
becomes apparent, if we consider the distri-
bution of strongly felt discrepancies with regard
to a single factor in detail. Table 5 shows this
distribution for the example of the social-
economic dimension of the 2-factor model A.
For each respondent, the number of strongly felt
discrepancies have been counted separately for
the socialist direction and the bourgeois direc-
tion. Since there are seven items associated with
this factor, the maximum number of discrep-
ancies in a given direction is seven. As can be
seen from the cross tabulation in Table 5, the
majority of the respondents feel strongly about
only a few items, and all their strong feelings
tend to point in the same direction. With regard
to this cluster of items, roughly two-thirds of the
sample (68-5 per cent) have strongly felt discrep-
ancies in one direction only, about one-seventh
(13-8 per cent) does not have any strongly felt
views at all, and only 17-7 per cent have at least
somewhat inconsistent views. Similar results can
be obtained for all the dimensions in the
different models. We may, thus, conclude that it
is not so much inconsistency, but fragmentation
of world views which is responsible for the
overall lack of structure in the belief systems of
the Dutch.
This result confirms Dalton's (1988) idea of a
diversification of political interests. As he put it
(p. 28): 'Everybody is sophisticated, only on
different subjects.' Given the complexity of
political life, its unintelligibility in a situation of
ideological disarray, ordinary citizens
economize time and energy by focusing on
selected aspects of the political universe particu-
larly salient to them. Of course, this sort of
partial sophistication falls short of the ideal of
differentiated and integrated belief systems, but
it is an indication of sophistication nevertheless.
As is also indicated by Table 5, the differenti-
ation and integration of belief systems is a
matter of degree. While only very few people
have a fully differentiated and integrated belief
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system, a much larger share of the citizens hold
political views which approach the ideal to a
considerable extent.
To arrive at overall measures of the degree of
differentiation and integration of individual
belief systems, I propose to construct summary
scales. These scales should take into account the
dimensionality of the ideological space. That is
we need separate measures for the different
dimensions. These measures should also take
into account the fact that most views are partial
ones, i.e. minor and selective discrepancies
should contribute to the size of the scales just as
well as substantial and encompassing ones.
Finally the scales should take care of apparent
inconsistencies. In other words, their size should
be proportional to the number, and to the
intensity of discrepancies associated with a given
dimension, which point in the same direction.
Discrepancies of different signs associated with
the same dimension should, however, reduce its
size. The mean value of an individual's signed
intensities with respect to all the items associ-
ated with a specific dimension fulfills all of these
exigencies. More sophisticated but essentially
similar measures are provided by an individual's
factor score on a given dimension of the
ideological space: factor scores are nothing else
but weighted means of the standardized signed
intensities associated with a given dimension.16
The relevance of the structure of belief systems
Finally, let me briefly approach the question of
the relevance of the structure of general political
beliefs for the analysis of political attitudes and
political behaviour. I have tried to predict two
important indicators which are likely to be
determined by general political beliefs—self-
placement on the left-right scale, and support
for new social movements17—on the basis of the
summary scales associated with the 1-factor
model, and with the best 2-factor and 3-factor
models. The predicative capacity of these three
models is compared to the one of the original set
of the 12 signed intensity items, to the one of the
two best predictors among the original items,
and to the one of Inglehart's postmaterialism
scale. Table 6 presents the results. Comparing
first the three models among themselves, we
note that the 3-factor model does better than the
TABLE 6 R2's for different predictors of left-right self-
placement and of support for new social movements
Left-right
self-
placement
Support for
NSMs
1. 1-factor model
2. 2-factor model C
3. 3-factor model
4. 12 original items
5. 2 best original items
6. postmaterialism scale
0-30
0-32
0-33
0-34
0-23
0 1 1
0-36
0-38
0-40
0-41
0-21
0-14
other two. However, the differences in perform-
ance between the three are quite small. Given
the limited advantage in predictive power of the
more complex models, one might want to prefer
the 1-factor model for reasons of parsimony.
However, this model has been shown to fit
poorly the overall structure of the Dutch belief
system. This means that we lose important
information, if we use the 1-factor model,
information which is contained in the 3-factor
model, which fits the structure rather well.
This information is conveyed by Table 7.
Left-right self-placement turns out to be
strongly influenced by one's position on the first
two, classical dimensions, but it is unrelated to
one's position on the third, 'new' dimension.
This is a very important result in the light of the
discussion on the dimensionality of the
ideological space and on the meaning of the
left-right continuum in Western European
politics. Cultural liberalism as well as social-
TABLE 7 Left-right self-placement, support for NSMs, and
ideological position: BETA-coefficients and ^-adjusted*')
1. Cultural dimension
2. Social-economic dim.
3. 'New' dimension
Readjusted
Left-right
self-
placement^'
-0-36"*
-0-42***
ns.
0-33
Support for
NSMs
0-22***
Oil**
0-41***
0-40
Note: (a) ns = not significant, "significant at the 1 per cent
level, *** significant at the 0-1 per cent level,
(b) scale ranging from 1 (left) to 10 (right).
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democratic views on the social-economic dimen-
sion both contribute to left self-placement. On
the other hand, one's position on the 'new'
dimension is the best predictor of support for the
so-called 'new' social movements. Support for
these movements is also enhanced to some
extent by cultural liberalism, and, less signifi-
cantly, by social-democratic views on social-
economic matters. Without going into the
details, this result is in line with the notion that
the disintegration of the classic ideological space
is—among other things—linked to the mobiliz-
ation of the new social movements.
Comparing the predictive power of the 3-
factor model to the one of the original 12 items,
we virtually find no difference at all. This means
that one could not do better by taking into
account all the details of the belief system. Or,
in other words, the uncovering of the essential
elements of structure allows for a considerable
amount of parsimony in our explanation. More-
over, to neglect considerations about structure
and to try to be parsimonious on purely induc-
tive grounds would mean to lose a considerable
amount of predictive power. This is indicated by
the performance of the two best predictors
among the original items—'strong army' and
'equal income'. Inglehart's postmaterialism
scale,18 finally, provides an external benchmark
for the evaluation of the performance of the
scales constructed here. As Table 6 shows, the
predictive performance of this widely used scale
for political beliefs falls far short of any of the
measures elaborated here.
CONCLUSION
I have proposed some concepts and measures to
analyze the structure of general political belief
systems of citizens in liberal democracies which
build on existing approaches that concentrate on
the analysis of political values. Applying these
concepts and measures to the belief systems of
the Dutch general public, I have found that
these are rather loosely structured, as was to be
expected given the present state of ideological
flux. Traces of the two classic dimensions of
ideological space could nevertheless still be
identified, as could indications of the existence
of a third, 'new' dimension concerning political
conflicts in 'new' issue areas. Conceptualizations
of the ideological space which assume that the
classical two dimensions can be collapsed into a
single, left-right continuum did not turn out to
be appropriate representations of the Dutch
situation. The relative absence of well inte-
grated, encompassing belief systems does, how-
ever, not imply that citizens generally hold
inconsistent beliefs. Under the conditions of
ideological flux, citizens do not so much hold
inconsistent, but partial views. But even if the
belief structures we found are predominantly
partial ones, it is well worth to take them into
account. Doing so allows for more parsimonious
explanations of important aspects of political
attitudes and political behavior.
The results obtained obviously reflect the
specificities of the Dutch context in the late
eighties. The degree of ideological flux may vary
from one country to the other, and between
different periods in one and the same country.
Such variation will considerably affect the
number and kind of dimensions of the
ideological space, as well as the extent of hori-
zontal and vertical constraint to be found. The
concepts and measures proposed are, however,
not tied to a given political context. They could
be applied to other contexts in an analogous
fashion to permit systematic comparisons across
time and space.
NOTES
1. It is important to note thet this approach to values
contrasts with the basic assumptions of Inglehart's
(1977) very influential conceptualization. While
Inglehart's theory is essentially psychological and
derives value-orientations from the perspective of a
Maslovian hierarchy of needs, the conceptualization of
Kluckhohn's et al. is essentially sociological and starts
from the idea that needs are interpreted within a
conceptual framework that already includes strong
value components. As these authors point out (p. 428):
'Values both rise from and create needs. A value serves
several needs partially, inhibits others partially, half
meets and half blocks still others.' In the same vein,
Cotgrove (1982: 50f) maintains that the generation and
distribution of values cannot be explained simply in
terms of need satisfaction or deprivation. Material
needs, he suggests, are met within the context of specific
social arrangements. Values refer as much to the 'pull of
aspirations and ideals' as they do to the 'push of needs'.
2. I refer here to Mannheim's distinction between
'ideologies' and 'Utopias': while 'ideologies' in
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Mannheim's terminology consist of beliefs which justify
existing social arrangements, 'Utopias' justify change. I
shall give a different interpretation to the concept of
'ideology' below.
3. One of the main reservations they have about such an
interpretation is 'that this effectively divorces environ-
mental concern from ecological problems. The environ-
ment is seen as just one among many "post-materialist"
issues which suddenly emerged to prominence,
unrelated to any change in the environment, through a
shift in values among people who had nothing else to
worry about.'
4. Rokeach (1973) also distinguishes between these two
fundamental dimensions of values, although he does not
talk about 'political values' but about 'political
ideologies'.
5. The new cleavage behind this alleged second dimension
is no longer seen to be rooted in social structure, but is
assumed to exist only on the basis of 'issue groups' (see,
e.g. Dalton, 1988: 175). Needless to say that this implies
a rather unorthodox interpretation of the concept of
'cleavage'.
6. It can, for example, be shown that the depillarization of
Dutch society did not render the religious cleavage
irrelevant. By increasing the number of those who no
longer belong to a church, and by weakening the
intensity of the affiliation of those who still belong, the
more general process of secularization has rendered
religion less relevant for the orientation of an increasing
part of the Dutch voters. For those who remain strongly
affiliated with a church, however, voting behavior is still
largely determined by their religious orientation (see
van der Eijck and Niemoller, 1983a; Thomassen, 1983).
7. One might object that someone who does not feel
strongly about any such discrepancies may be a highly
self-conscious defendant of the status quo. While being
aware of this possibility, I still think that it is very
unlikely that a politically sophisticated person takes
such an extremely uncritical point of view of the status
quo.
8. To check whether the sequence of the first two questions
affects the answers given, I ran a pretest with a split
sample of 69 respondents, half of which received the
value question first, followed by the belief question. The
other half received the questions in the sequence given
here. The mean responses of the two groups with regard
to values and beliefs were then tested for significant
differences. Of the 40 t-tests performed—20 items for
values and beliefs each—, only three turned out to be
significant. This I took as an indication that the
sequence of the two questions did not affect the answers
given.
9. Following the advice of Converse and Presser (1986), no
middle position was allowed for, but I added a
category for 'don't know/no opinion'. In the pretest, I
used a seven-point scale without a 'don't know/no
opinion' category. In combination with the fact that in
the pretest, the cursor was preset on the middle category
for this question and had to be moved along the
horizontally placed seven-points scale in order to answer
the question, this induced an unexpectedly large
number of respondents to choose for the middle
position.
10. The items dropped because of lack of variation
included: influence of experts, welfare services,
economic growth, possibilities for alternative lifestyles,
government control over the citizens' privacy, partici-
pation in decision making on the job, government
control over business, support for scientific progress.
11. After the questions about the belief systems, the
respondents have been asked how often they think
about these matters. One-fifth of the respondents
indicated that they 'often' think about such fundamental
political questions. They represent the group of those
who are most concerned by these matters.
12. With regard to individual political sophistication,
Luskin's point is, of course, well taken. Correspondence
between an individual's belief system and a collective
ideology may be the result of a rather rigid adherence to
a party-line, while an idiosyncratic configuration of
political beliefs could be the mark of an individual with a
truly well-developed belief system (Barton and Parsons,
1977: 178).
13. An intriguing question is whether measurement errors
may also indicate a lack of consistency on the part of the
respondents, as Converse (1980) suggests in his rejoin-
der to Judd and Milburn (1980).
14. For the group most concerned, the correlation with the
cultural dimension is almost the same as for the sample
as a whole (r = 0-34), while the one with the social-
economic dimension is somewhat smaller (r = 0-48).
15. Hamill et al. (1985: 856) try to take into account this
problem by introducing a weighting procedure, which is,
however, not made very explicit in their article.
16. The essential similarity of the simple means, and of the
factor scores is illustrated by the fact that the factor
scores for the best two-dimensional solution (model C)
and the corresponding simple means correlate with 0-97
for the social-economic dimension, and with 0-92 for the
cultural dimension. For the three-dimensional solution
(final model), the correlations for the three dimensions
are: 0-96, 0-98, and 0-91. Apparently, the weights
employed by the factor scores do not have a substantial
impact on the final summary measures.
17. Self-placement on a left-right scale has been measured
in a straightforward way on a ten-point scale. The
measure for the support of new social movements is
based on questions asking about sympathy, readiness
for participation, and participation in five different such
movements—the ecology, anti-nuclear, women's,
peace, and anti-apartheid movement. Indicators for the
support of each of these movements, and a summary
indicator for the support of all of them have been
constructed.
18. For this comparison, I have used the postmaterialism
index based on Inglehart's original four-item procedure.
As has been shown by Hagstotz (1985), this simple
procedure leads to a scale which is in agreement with the
theoretical assumptions made by Inglehart. The ordinal
scale based on this procedure has four categories: (1)
materialist; (2) rather materialist; (3) rather
postmaterialist; (4) postmaterialist.
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FIGURE A-l Exact wording of the question about existing
Dutch society (political belief)
Do you think that in Dutch society one puts
RELATIVELY LITTLE EMPHASIS on LAW AND
ORDER, or do you think that in the Netherlands one puts
a RELATIVELY GREAT EMPHASIS on LAW AND
ORDER.
If you think that in the Netherlands one puts LITTLE
emphasis on law and order, type 1 or a number close to 1.
If you think that in the Netherlands one puts GREAT
emphasis on law and order, type 6 or a number close to 6.
Is the existing society one with
1. LITTLE EMPHASIS ON LAW AND ORDER
2.
3.
4.
5.
6. GREAT EMPHASIS ON LAW AND ORDER
7. Don't know/no opinion
FIGURE A-3 Exact wording of the question about the
evaluation of the discrepancy between the political value and
the corresponding belief
You indicated that the existing situation and the one you
desire differ from each other.
We now want to know HOW SERIOUS you think this
discrepancy is.
We show you once again your answers:
you gave the EXISTING situation (value from question 1)
and the DESIRABLE situation (value from question 2)
1=LITTLE EMPHASIS ON LAW AND ORDER
6=GREAT EMPHASIS ON LAW AND ORDER
If you find this discrepancy VERY SERIOUS, draw this
line:
If you find the discrepancy NOT SERIOUS AT ALL, draw
this line:
Draw now a line to indicate HOW SERIOUS you find this
discrepancy:
FIGURE A-2 Exact wording of the question about the
desirable Dutch society (political value)
And now the question about what, according to your
opinion, is DESIRABLE in the Netherlands.
What do you find DESIRABLE?
1. LITTLE EMPHASIS ON LAW AND ORDER
2.
3.
4.
5.
6. GREAT EMPHASIS ON LAW AND ORDER
7. Don't know/no opinion
